An Investment and Equality-Led Sustainable Development Strategy for Europe by Onaran, Özlem et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
An Investment and Equality-Led Sustainable
Development Strategy for Europe
Other
How to cite:
Onaran, O¨zlem; Andersen, Lars; Cozzi, Giovanni; Dahl, Signe; Nissen, Thea; Obst, Thomas and Tori, Daniele
(2017). An Investment and Equality-Led Sustainable Development Strategy for Europe. University of Greenwich,
London.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2017 The authors
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/16212
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Investment and Equality-Led Sustainable 
Development Strategy for Europe 
 
Özlem Onaran, Lars Andersen, Giovanni Cozzi, Signe Dahl, Thea Nissen, Thomas Obst, Daniele Tori 
 
Abstract 
 
Austerity policies coupled with rising inequality in Europe have resulted in a 
prolonged stagnation and a vicious circle of chronically low demand, slow down in 
investment and productivity, and economic, social and political instability. In order to end this 
vicious cycle, Europe needs directed public investment policies accompanied by industrial 
policy, higher equality, stimulated demand, and regulation of finance and corporate 
governance. Our research presents strong empirical evidence that expansionary fiscal 
policy is sustainable when wage and public investment policies are combined with 
progressive tax policy; the impact is stronger when these policies are implemented in a 
coordinated fashion across Europe due to strong positive spill over effects on demand. A 
strong investment performance also requires a process of de-financialization of the 
economy and a new approach to corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past 20 years investment across Europe has drastically declined with severe 
negative consequences for growth and employment opportunities. Europe has also lagged 
behind in terms of innovation and technological development in comparison to other 
developed countries such as the US and Japan. The Great Recession and harsh austerity 
measures implemented across Europe has further aggravated these problems and has led to a 
further retrenchment of investment, increase in unemployment and a growth collapse. 
Austerity policies coupled with rising inequality in Europe have resulted in a 
prolonged stagnation and a vicious circle of chronically low demand, slow down in 
investment and productivity, and economic, social and political instability. In order to end this 
vicious cycle Europe requires coordinated public investment and incomes policies in all the 
EU Member States as well as a reform of corporate governance and finance. 
This paper summarizes the findings of four recent reports by Obst, Onaran and 
Nikolaidi (2017), Tori and Onaran (2017), Cozzi (2017) and Andersen, Dahl and Nissen 
(2017) and derives the policy implications. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 presents the stylised facts of rising inequality, increasing financialization and 
stagnation in growth. Section 3 discusses a wage and fiscal policy mix and its implications for 
growth, private investment, trade balance, budget balance and price stability. Section 4 
analyses the role of de-financialization in order to reinstate the link between private 
investment and profits. Section 5 presents simulation results regarding the impact of public 
investment  in social and physical infrastructure with the win  aims of  decarbonising the 
economy and achieving higher gender equality. Section 6 presents the details of an alternative 
green-social investment plan in Europe.  Finally, section 7 concludes with policy 
implications.  
 
2. Falling wage share, increasing financialization and stagnation in growth  
At the core of the slowdown in growth rates along with higher volatility in Europe lies 
the missing link between profits and investment, which in turn is close related to rising 
inequality and financialization.    
In the last three and a half decades, inequality has increased substantially and the share 
of national income that goes to wages has fallen dramatically across the world as a result of a 
significant fall in trade union density and collective bargaining coverage along with 
globalization, financialization, and welfare state retrenchment (Guschanski and Onaran, 2016; 
Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Stockhammer, 2016).   
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Figures 1 shows the developments in the share of wages in national income (labour 
compensation, adjusted for the labour income of the self employed, as a ratio to GDP at factor 
cost) along with the rate of growth of GDP in the 15 Western European Member States of the 
EU (EU15).1 In Europe (the EU15), the share of wages declined from 72.8% in 1975 in their 
peak to 62.6% in 2007. While in the early years of the recession, the wage share in the EU15 
has increased slightly, there has been a 1%-point fall during 2009-2011, since when the wage 
share has been stagnant.  Growth performance of the EU15 has been disappointing along with 
the secular fall in the wage share: average annual growth has fallen from 4.7% during 1961-
1974 to 1.9% during 1960-1974. 
Figure 1 
Wage stagnation has fuelled increasing profits, but this has led to bleak prospects in 
terms of demand. While this is a puzzle from a neoclassical point of view, it is not unexpected 
for Post-Keynesian/Kaleckian economics, which highlight the dual role of wages as both a 
cost item and source of demand. Econometric findings in the Post-Kaleckian research shows 
that a lower share of wages in national income leads to a lower GDP in the majority of the 
large countries (Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi, 2017; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Onaran and Galanis, 
2014; Onaran, Stockhammer, Grafl, 2011; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Naastepad, and Storm, 
2006;  Stockhammer and Onaran, 2004), and the negative impact is amplified when wage 
stagnation policies are imposed in an integrated region such as the EU via the European 
Commission policies (Onaran and Galanis, 2014; Onaran and Obst, 2016; Stockhammer, 
Onaran, Ederer, 2009). Hence the demand regime is wage-led in the majority of the large 
countries and in large economic regions such as the EU or globally. This is not only because a 
pro-capital redistribution of income leads lower domestic consumption demand, but also the 
stimulus to private investment due to higher profits remain weak, if any at all, while private 
investment responds strongly to demand.  Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi (2017) show that despite 
increasing profits, private investment decreased in the majority of the EU15 countries due to 
the substantially negative impact of the simultaneous fall in the wage share on demand across 
the EU15. Firms’ directing their profits to financial speculation in the absence of a healthy 
growth in demand is a result of this process as much as it contributes to the lack of demand. 
The much celebrated impact of wage stagnation on external demand is rather weak in the case 
of large, relatively closed economies, and the impact is diminished substantially when all 
                                                 
1
 EU15 currently includes the UK. Despite the Brexit decision we keep the UK as part of our analysis for 
Europe, as policy coordination issues we discuss in the paper can be implemented even when countries are not 
part of a political union, although we recognise the importance of political union to facilitate such policy 
coordination. 
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countries implement the same international competiveness policies based on labour market 
flexibility and cuts to labour costs. This leaves countries with the net negative impact of rising 
inequality on domestic demand, i.e. the sum of the effects on domestic consumption and 
private investment. Moreover, a small country, e.g. Belgium in the EU15, which has a profit-
led demand regime, i.e. a country, which could grow along with an increasing profit share (a 
falling wage share) if it is the only country experiencing this shift in income distribution, also 
starts experiencing lower demand and growth, when its trade partners also implement similar 
wage moderation policies (Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi, 2017).  There is a fallacy of composition 
both at the national level between the rational of the firm vs. the aggregate economy, and at 
the European level between the national rational of a small economy vs. the European 
economy.  
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the lack of a full recovery in wage income 
continues to be a drag on household confidence and demand, which in turn discourages 
business investment in the absence of a healthy growth in domestic demand. In the past, 
countries such as the UK in the core, or Spain and Ireland in the European Periphery relied on 
household debt to maintain consumption levels in the absence of a healthy growth in their 
wages and salaries. The mirror image of this debt-driven growth model was the export-led 
growth model of Germany, or Austria in the core, where countries tried to export their way 
out of the problem of deficiency of domestic demand faxed with a declining wage share.  
After the crisis, Europe’s economic model is still based on the same shaky grounds of this 
dual model, and we are far from correcting the European imbalances.   
The second important reason behind the weak private investment performance in 
Europe, despite increasing profits, is the impact of financialization on firms’ decisions. Figure 
2 shows the trends in investment (the additions to fixed assets) as a ratio to operating income 
in publicly listed non-financial corporations in both Europe as whole and selected economies. 
A common feature of the last twenty years has been a reduction in the reinvestment of the 
profit of the non-financial corporations (NFCs) in the majority of the countries between 1995 
and 2015 (Tori and Onaran, 2017). Overall, the slowdown in investment has been remarkable 
in Europe, with a 32% decline in the re-investment rate on average, where NFCs are investing 
about 33% of their profits as of 2015; this ratio was 50% in 1995.  The highest fall is in 
Sweden (-49%), the UK (-32%), and Italy (-28%).   
NFCs have been engaging in non-operating activities, i.e. accumulating financial 
assets, to an increasing extent. As can be seen in Figure 3, the ratio of financial assets to fixed 
assets clearly increased albeit with some differences: on average in Europe, the ratio increased 
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by 93%; as of 2015 NFCs financial assets are 3.3 times their fixed assets in Europe (Tori and 
Onaran, 2017). The UK, Germany and Sweden experienced the strongest rise in this ratio.   
Figure 4 shows that during 1995-2015 the NFCs’ rate of accumulation (I/K) has been 
stagnant around an average value of 24% (Tori and Onaran, 2017). At the same time, NFCs’ 
financial payments (dividends plus interests as a ratio to fixed assets) have been increasing 
significantly. There is also a sharp increase in the level of non-operating incomes (as a ratio to 
fixed assets) before the crisis (173%). The 2007-8 crisis has led to a reversal in the NFCs’ 
financial incomes, although they are slowly recovering towards the levels of the early 2000s.   
Figure2 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
In the absence of strong investment performance and stagnant demand, it is no wonder 
that Europe is in a phase of secular stagnation with low productivity and low potential growth. 
Productivity has two components (Onaran, 2016): one is simply actual productivity, which is 
related to demand as output is demand driven. The second component is about technological 
change, which is related to both investment and wage costs. Investment responds to demand; 
lower wages not only leads to lower demand and affects investment through the demand 
channel, but also makes firms less reluctant to invest due to a tendency to exploit low labour 
costs.  
 
3. The impact of a coordinated mix of public investment and incomes policies on growth, 
private investment and budget balance 
Recent research by Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi (2017) presents the impact of a 
coordinated policy mix of increased public investment together with more progressive 
taxation and labour market policies to improve income distribution in Europe.  
Based on an econometric model for 15 individual EU Member states, Obst, Onaran 
and Nikolaidi (2017) set out an alternative scenario of a policy mix that includes 4 policies 
implemented simultaneously in each country: (a) a pro-labour wages policy and expansionary 
fiscal policy based on 1%-point increase in the pre-tax wage share and a 1%-point increase in 
public spending (column A in Table 1); (b) a progressive tax policy based on a 1%-point fall 
in the tax rate on wages; and a 1%-point increase in the tax rate on profits (column B in Table 
1), and (c) a policy mix that combines the effects of all 4 policies (column C in Table 1).  The 
outcome of the latter, i.e. pro-labour pre-distribution and redistribution and fiscal expansion is 
6.6% higher GDP in the EU.  
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Table 1 
As a result of this mix of four policies, private investment increases as well by 1.5% as 
a ratio to GDP (on average in Europe); i.e. overall public spending does not crowd out but 
rather crowds in private investment despite a rise in tax rates on profits (Obst, Onaran and 
Nikolaidi, 2017, column D in Table 1).2   
Table 2 outlines the results of these policies simultaneously implemented in all 
countries on the budget balance. Despite the rise in public spending, the budget balance in 
Europe improves (by 0.8% as a ratio to GDP) because the beneficial fiscal effects of higher 
economic growth and higher tax rates on capital prevail (Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi, 2017).  
Table 2 
The concerns regarding the inflationary effects of wage increases are also not 
supported by empirical evidence. Our policy mix leads to only a modest 1.5 % increase in the 
price level in Europe on average (Obst, Onaran and Nikolaidi, 2017). In fact, a wage stimulus 
would help to keep the European economy away from deflation and closer to the inflation 
target of the ECB.   
Growth, private investment and budget balance improves both in the periphery and 
core countries of Europe.3 The effects of this policy mix on GDP are strongest in Finland 
(11.7%), Greece (14.5%) and Spain (15.5%). 4  GDP increases by more than 2% in all 
countries: e.g. by 5.8% in Denmark, 6.6% in Germany, 5.1% in France, 2.68% in Ireland, 
3.8% in Italy, 7.3% in Portugal, 9.7% in Sweden and 4.5% in the UK.   
 
4. De-financialization of the economy and reinstating the missing link between private 
investments and profits     
Recent research by Tori and Onaran (2017) analyses the impact of financialization on 
private investment in Europe. Based on the balance sheet data of publicly listed non-
financial corporations (NFCs) in Europe, Tori and Onaran (2017) show that 
financialization has led to an increasing orientation towards external financing and 
                                                 
2
 The effects on investment are strongest in countries with significant effect of G on I; for instance       
increases by 2.1%-points in Austria or 4.2%-points in Finland. The effects are weaker in countries without 
significant effect of G on I and/or with significant negative effect of public debt such as in Belgium (0.8%-
points), in the UK (0.8%-points), Denmark (0.8) and Ireland (1.6).  
3
 Only in Greece and Ireland this policy mix does not improve the budget balance, though the impact on the 
budget is negligible, and the gains in terms of growth and private investment are substantial in these countries 
too. 
4
 These countries had high differences in marginal propensity to consume, no significant effect of profit share 
but significant government expenditure effects on private investment. See Table 9 in Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi 
(2017) for details. 
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shareholder value orientation as well as the substitution of fixed investment by financial 
activity. Both aspects of financialization had a fundamental role in suppressing 
investment in the NFCs. On the one hand, the increase in financial payments (both 
interest and dividend payments) have a negative effect on investment. On the other 
hand, the rise in financial activities in search for short term financial profits crowd out 
investment in physical machinery and equipment. Perversely financial activities do not 
provide more funds for productive activity.  
Based on econometric estimations by Tori and Onaran (2017), Table 3 presents the 
economic impact of financialization.5 The rate of investment by the NFCs in Europe would 
have been 27% higher without the rise in interest and dividend payments (financial 
payments), and 10% higher without the crowding-out effect of increasing financial incomes.  
Table 3 
The growth of the financial markets and intermediaries delinked from the 
financing requirements of NFCs has been incentivizing firms to heavily engage in non-
operating (non-core) activities, ultimately leading to stagnant levels of investment. 
Results by Tori and Onaran (2017) suggest that, even though at low levels of financial 
development, an increase in financial development has a positive effect on investment in 
small companies through enhanced resource allocation, in countries with high levels of 
financial development a perverse effect on investment dominates.  
Table 4 presents the economic effects of financialization accounting for the 
differences in the companies’ sizes and levels of financial development of the country 
based on (Tori and Onaran, 2017). Financial incomes have a positive effect on 
investment only for the small companies in countries with low levels of financial 
development, but a significant negative effect in the large as well as small companies in 
countries with high levels of financial development. It has to be noted that larger 
companies create the vast majority of capital, and the crowding-out of physical 
investment of these companies by financial activity is a substantial drag on the 
investment performance and productivity of the European countries. The crowding-out 
effect of financialization has not been addressed carefully by policy makers so far, in 
                                                 
5
 Economic effects are calculated as follows: First, the long-run elasticities are calculated by dividing each short-
run elasticity by one minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Multiplying the long-run elasticity 
by the actual cumulative change in each variable for the estimation period, we get the corresponding economic 
effect. The economic effects are computed based on elasticities estimated for the period 1995-2007, thus 
excluding the impact of the financial crisis, after which financial activities have been severely affected. 
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particular because of the strength of the conventional idea that ‘every additional fund is 
good for investment’ (Tori and Onaran, 2017).  
Table 4 
 Looking at some country cases, in the UK, in large NFCs, investment rate would 
have been 16% higher without the rise in financial payments, and 41% higher without 
the increasing financial incomes, and in the small NFCs, investment would have been 
35% higher without the rise in financial incomes. In Ireland and Denmark, in large NFCs, 
investment rate would have been 14% and 33% higher without the rise in financial 
payments; in these countries there is a positive impact of financial incomes only on the 
small NFCs.  
A process of de-financialization of the non-financial sector is a pre-condition for a 
stable and vigorous investment performance.   
 
5. The role of public and private investment in creating an equitable and green recovery 
in Europe  
Since the Great Recession, the process of domestic financialization – underway before 
the crisis – has been deepened, with excess financial capital diverted to unproductive 
purposes, including consumer credit and real estate speculation. Productive sectors within 
many parts of Europe have been constrained by unmet credit demand despite this massive 
financial growth. The shortfall is especially profound in the area of the financing of new long-
term investment projects. To make matters worse, intermediaries with historically-important 
roles in financing industrial and commercial growth, such as the German Landesbanken 
(regional banks) and Spanish Cajas (savings banks), have had a reduced capacity to perform 
this function, due to crisis-linked insolvency problems and stricter capital/asset requirements. 
In order to put Europe on a new developmental trajectory where equitable and 
sustainable growth and employment take centre stage it is essential to boost both public and 
private investment and re-direct resources towards both employment-focused and sustainable 
(e.g. in terms of energy efficiency) activities.  
Using the Cambridge Alphametric Model of the World economy (CAM), Cozzi 
(2017) presents and discusses the characteristics of an investment-led strategy for equitable 
and sustainable economic recovery as an alternative to economics of austerity.  This paper 
contrasts and compares three alternative policy scenarios for Europe for the period until 2025. 
The focus of analysis is the Eurozone (divided in North Eurozone – which includes Germany, 
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France, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria and South Eurozone – which includes Spain, 
Portugal, Greece, Ireland and Italy) and the United Kingdom. The first scenario assumes the 
continuation of past trends and current austerity policies (continued reduction in government 
expenditure) without any significant innovation in European politics and a mild increase in 
private investment as a result of the implementation of the 315 bn Euro Investment Plan for 
Europe (Austerity Scenario). This scenario also includes a significant devaluation of the 
British pound as a result of the planned departure from the EU. The austerity scenario is then 
contrasted with two alternative scenarios. The first alternative scenario (Expansionary 
Macroeconomic Scenario) assumes that government expenditure and private investment are 
the key strategy to increasing employment and economic growth. As such, we marshal 
government spending towards employment generation. In other words, the increase of 
government expenditure is calibrated in order to achieve a desirable and feasible ratio of the 
employed to working age-population (75% in the United Kingdom, 73% in the North 
Eurozone and 60% in the South Eurozone by 2025). This scenario also assumes a boost in 
government net revenue in conjunction with the projected increase in government 
expenditure. This allows for a containment of future government deficits and for a further 
stimulus to aggregate demand. Finally, the expansionary scenario assumes an annual 
investment boost of 0.4% of the GDP of the EU in 2015, on top of existing investment 
resources and the Investment Plan for Europe, over the period until 2025. As a result of this 
major boost, investment as percentage of GDP is set to reach 22% in the Eurozone and in the 
United Kingdom by 2025. 
The second alternative scenario (Sustainable and equitable macro scenario) also 
assumes that private investment and government expenditure are the key drivers for 
stimulating future growth and for generating jobs for both men and women. As such, this 
scenario specifies the same assumptions as those of the expansionary macroeconomic 
scenario. However, this scenario has two unique and novel features: 
1. Investment in social infrastructure: In this scenario investment in both physical 
and social infrastructure (i.e. investment in nurseries, hospitals, and housing and 
more generally on services providing care, health, education and training) are key 
drivers for economic recovery. Here, both types of investment are deemed to be 
necessary to cure low aggregate demand in the short term and to increase potential 
output, bring about innovation, improve gender relations and reduce gender 
inequality in the labour market in the long-term (Bargawi and Cozzi 2017). To 
achieve this objective, this scenario assumes that government expenditure is re-
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directed towards the creation of more jobs for women than men so that the ratio of 
female employment to male employment increases over time (Table 5).  
Table 5 
In other words, this scenario assumes a disproportionate increase in female 
employment vis-à-vis male employment. By disproportionally directing 
government expenditure towards supporting female employment this scenario 
assumes that women will benefit the most from the expansion of productive 
capacity. Investment in both physical and social infrastructure has the potential to 
enable more women to re-entering the labour market. This is of particular 
importance given the low levels of female employment in many south Eurozone 
countries and because women were hit the most by austerity measures. 
2. Decarbonisation and investment in low-carbon productive sectors: in this 
scenario, the second key driver for economic recovery in Europe is investment to 
facilitate a European process of decarbonisation. Such a process, coupled with 
government strategies to transition towards a greener economy (at least in terms of 
improvements of energy efficiency, conservation and smart use of natural capital, 
investment in local productions and non-import intensive sectors of the economy, 
etc.) would allow for an expansion of output in a sustainable manner, create jobs 
and at the same time address the environmental crisis (Campiglio 2014, Ilkkaracan 
2017). To achieve this objective this scenario assumes that part of the increase in 
public and private investment is re-directed towards the creation of more 
renewable energy so that the share of non-carbon energy to total energy production 
increases overtime (Table 6). In addition in order to facilitate the process of 
decarbonisation and to generate resources for low-carbon investment this scenario 
also assumes the introduction of a progressive carbon tax. 
Table 6     
Results generated by CAM model shed light on the importance of increasing both 
private and public investment across the European Union and of re-directing this investment 
both towards employment generating activities (e.g. by boosting investment in social 
infrastructure and in other labor-intensive sectors of the economy) and towards innovation, 
decarbonisation and energy efficiency.  
What is the macroeconomic impact of these three scenarios? Cozzi (2017) presents the 
projections produced under the assumptions described for each of the three scenarios. First, 
with regards to economic growth (Table 7), under the austerity scenario GDP growth is 
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projected to stagnate both in the south Eurozone and in the United Kingdom, whilst it only 
marginally increases in the north Eurozone. Thus, it is possible to argue that the combination 
of continued austerity policy and a mild investment plan is not sufficient to generate 
economic growth in Europe.  
Table 7 
A comparison of the two alternative scenarios reveals that similar rates of economic 
growth are achieved in both the North Eurozone and in the United Kingdom. However, the 
South Eurozone achieves higher growth rates under the expansionary scenario compared to 
the sustainable and equitable scenario. If these two alternative scenarios were assessed solely 
on the basis of output growth, one would discount the sustainable and equitable scenario. 
However, once other macroeconomic and environmental indicators are taken into 
consideration, the sustainable and equitable scenario achieves much better results in terms of 
equitable job creation for both women and men and also better results in terms of CO2 
emissions.  
Furthermore, when government deficit and government debt are taken into 
consideration the expansionary macroeconomic scenario is discounted on the basis of 
unrealistic levels of government spending (Table 8), high levels of fiscal deficits and 
government debt, especially for the South Eurozone.   
Table 8 
The results regarding government spending reveal that it is much more cost effective 
to invest in both physical and social infrastructure compared to a scenario where investment 
in physical infrastructure is the main investment strategy. In addition, this investment strategy 
leads to higher employment levels both for women and men. Indeed, whilst under the 
austerity scenario there are poor gains in terms of employment creation, both alternative 
scenarios lead to higher levels of employment (e.g. under both scenario total employment in 
the south Eurozone would increase from 51 million in 2015 to almost 57 million in 2025). 
What is interesting to note is the difference in employment creation for women under the two 
alternative scenarios. Whilst results on total employment are similar the distribution of jobs 
between men and women is different. Under the equitable and sustainable scenario 1.4 million 
more jobs for women are created in the Eurozone and in the United Kingdom compared to the 
expansionary scenario (and 7.4 million more jobs for women compared to the austerity 
scenario). Thus, it is possible to conclude that the equitable and sustainable scenario can lead 
to important gains in terms of female employment across Europe and has the potential to 
narrow the employment gap between women and men, in particular in the south Eurozone. 
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Furthermore, under the sustainable and equitable macroeconomic scenario, re-
directing investment towards non-carbon energy and the implementation of a carbon tax also 
leads to significant environmental gains. Annual CO2 emissions are the lowest under the 
austerity scenario and the highest under the expansionary macroeconomic scenario, whilst the 
sustainable and equitable scenario has slightly higher CO2 emissions compared to the 
austerity scenario. However, the analysis of emission intensity  -i.e. CO2 emissions per dollar 
of GDP (Table 9)- shows that emission intensity significantly reduces under the sustainable 
and equitable scenario compared to both the expansionary and the austerity scenarios. Thus, 
the sustainable and equitable scenario leads to much higher growth compared to the austerity 
scenario and at the same time emission intensity is significantly reduced. 
In sum the analysis presented in Cozzi (2017) demonstrates that continued austerity 
policies are doing more harm than good for the economies and societies of Europe. In 
addition, it also demonstrates the importance of adopting expansionary macroeconomic 
policies for Europe which puts at center stage investment in social infrastructure as well as 
physical infrastructure and decarbonisation as key features for a sustainable and equitable 
economic recovery for Europe. 
 
6. A Green-Social Investment Plan can create jobs and wealth all over Europe 
Since the economic crisis started almost 10 years ago, many European countries have 
faced a number of severe economic problems, among these low levels of investment. Both 
public and private investments have decreased the last decade. In times of crisis, the national 
governments should step in and help the economy back on track with fiscal policies and 
public investments, but this has not been the case. It leaves us in a situation where there is a 
major need to increase the European growth potential in the medium and long run for Europe 
to regain momentum in growth.  
The fall in investment is connected to a fall in demand, an increase in insecurity and 
low growth expectations for the future. Some fear that it is the start of a vicious circle. If the 
necessary investments to secure future economic growth are not made, it is hard to see how 
the economy can reach its full growth potential. This can lead to further insecurity, which in 
the worst case means a continuation of the low level of investments. On the other hand, the 
government can take the first step to ensure future growth because public investments can lay 
the foundation for private investment and growth in general. Unfortunately, this has not been 
the case. 
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The European countries lead different fiscal policies of which most have been and are 
still biased towards austerity at a national level. Whereas in some cases, the national 
government is to be blamed for the lack of public investment, the EU has been the limiting 
factor in other cases. Currently, the interest rates are at very low levels, but this has not been 
sufficient to stimulate private investments. Since the low interest rates of course also apply to 
public borrowers, it is a good time for a public investment initiative across Europe – both 
nationally and across countries.  
In Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) an investment plan with a green and social focus 
is presented. The investment plan is based on calculations on the FEPS-ECLM International 
Input-Output ModelAndersen and Dahl (2016).6  
Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) presents an investment plan that specifically 
focuses on green investments in construction, research and development (R&D) and social 
investments in education and childcare. These areas of investments are very important for 
future growth. There is general agreement and concern about the climate changes and action 
is required to change to a production based on a high degree of green energy. Combining the 
green investments with the social investments we can both improve the education level and 
the framework conditions for more women to enter the labour force. By implementing a 
simultaneous investment strategy across the European Union, we can obtain higher economic 
growth, productivity and prosperity.  
The effects of the Green-Social Investment Plan are calculated based on the FEPS-
ECLM International Input-Output Model. It is assumed that the investment level is increased 
by 1 percent of GDP in all 27 EU countries. The investment plan is decomposed into a green 
part and a social part that both add up to half of the invested amount, i.e. ½ percent of GDP is 
invested in green investments and ½ percent of GDP is invested in social investments.7  
In the following, we dig deeper into the effects of the Green-Social Investment Plan on 
employment and GDP. Figure 5 gives an overview of how many jobs are created for men and 
women by the green and the social investments, respectively. Overall, the figure shows that 
while the green investments create most jobs for men, the social part of the investment plan 
creates most jobs for women. The green investments create around 800,000 jobs for men, but 
it only creates 370,000 jobs for women. On the other hand, the social investments create 
                                                 
6
 For more details about the model, see FEPS-ECLM: International Input-Output Model Documentation, 
Andersen and Dahl (2016). 
7
 For more technical details about the Green-Social Investment Plan see Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) 
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340,000 jobs for men, but more than a million jobs for women. In other words, the share of 
women is much larger in the “social” sectors compared to the “green” sectors.  
In total, more than 1.3 million male jobs and 1.4 million female jobs are created, so the 
investment plan creates slightly more jobs for women than for men and thereby improve the 
gender balance in the labour market. In total the Green-Social Investment Plan will create 2.8 
million jobs in EU-27. 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 divides the job creation from the green and social part of the investment plan 
into jobs for low-, medium- and high-skilled workers. The figure shows that overall, most 
jobs are created for medium-skilled workers, who experience an increase of more than 1.1 
million jobs. This is followed closely by the job creation for high-skilled, which is of almost 
1.1 million. Finally, almost 550,000 jobs are created for low-skilled workers. 
Of course, the two parts of the investment plans have different focuses and create 
more jobs for differently skilled workers. For the low-skilled, the largest part of the jobs is 
created from the green investments. For the medium-skilled around half of the jobs come 
from green investments and the other half from social investments. Finally, for the high-
skilled, almost 4/5 jobs are created thanks to the social investments. As the figure shows, most 
jobs are created for the medium- and high-skilled and this underlines the importance of the 
social part of the investment plan, where education and further training is key.  
Figure 6 
In table 10, the effects of the Green-Social Investment Plan are considered in the 
specific sectors in which the investments are undertaken. Further, the spillover effects on 
other sectors are considered. These spillover effects happen because the different sectors in 
the economy are connected and when the activity increases in one sector, it spreads like 
ripples in a pond to other sectors. In table 3, the effects are divided into direct effects and 
indirect effects. The direct effect is the effect of investing directly in that specific sector. The 
indirect effect is the effect of an increase in demand in industries that deliver input into the 
sector that we invest in directly. The induced demand in these industries will again spur 
demand for intermediate input from other industries.  
The green investments are made in the construction sector and in the R&D sector, 
which is clear because it is the only sectors, where the green investments have a direct effect. 
As an example, the direct effect of the investments in construction accounts for almost 
500,000 jobs, an increase of 3.2 percent of GDP compared to the level the sector had before 
and a growth contribution of 0.19 percentage points to total GDP, i.e. one fifth of the total 
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GDP effect of 1 percent. As for the indirect effect, the employment increases with almost 
100,000 jobs indirectly in the construction sector. In the R&D sector, the difference between 
direct and indirect effect on employment is much smaller. While the direct effects of the 
investments create 151,000 jobs, 125,000 jobs are created indirectly in the sector. The 
increase in GDP that occurs indirectly in the sector is just as big as the one that occurs 
directly. The spill-over effects from the green investments on other sectors create 300,000 
jobs and a growth contribution to GDP of 0.15 percentage points.  
 
The social investments are also spread out on two sectors: Education and health and 
social work. In these sectors, more than 1.3 million jobs are created directly, and the direct 
growth contribution to GDP is of 0.42 percentage points. On the other hand, the indirect effect 
is quite small. Less than 60,000 jobs are created indirectly in the two sectors, but the spillover 
effects account for almost 200,000 jobs created in other sectors.  
 
Overall, the table shows that while the direct effects on employment and GDP are 
largest, the indirect effects are of such a size that they should not be neglected.  
Table 10 
The input-output model gives a very detailed analysis of the direct- and indirect 
effects, disaggregated by country-, sector-, gender-, and educational distribution. But the 
results from the input-output model in Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) does not take into 
account the effect of extra spending power, meaning the effect that the effect of higher 
employment from the investment plan will lead to a higher overall income level of 
households, and this in turn will lead to higher private consumption and higher investments, 
which further  stimulates the GDP.  
To illustrate the effects of the extra spending power, Andersen, Dahl and Nissen 
(2017) compare the multiplier from the international macroeconomic model Heimdal (see 
Bjørsted and Dahl (2012)), with the results from the input-output model. By comparing the 
two different multipliers it is seen that the final effect of the Green-Social Investment Plan 
might be as much as double the size of the effects when the extra spending power is included. 
The results above clearly show that after a decade with falling investment levels and 
weak growth, implementing the Green-Social Investment Plan could be an important step in 
the right direction, finally raising the level of investment across the EU and improve and 
secure future growth. 
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7. Policies for an investment and equality-led sustainable development strategy in 
Europe 
To reinstate the missing link between private investments and profits, Europe needs 
directed public investment policies accompanied by a properly designed industrial policy, 
higher equality, stimulated demand, and regulation of finance and corporate governance. 
Our research presents strong empirical evidence that expansionary fiscal policy is 
sustainable when wage and public investment policies are combined with progressive tax 
policy; the impact is stronger when these policies are implemented in a coordinated fashion 
across Europe due to strong positive spill over effects on demand (Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi, 
2017). Such a coordinated policy mix, along with a properly designed industrial policy can 
ensure genuine regional convergence and social cohesion in Europe.   
A wage-led development strategy as part of a macroeconomic economic policy 
package requires the use of both pre-distributive as well as re-distributive policies. Pre-
distributive policies can aim at improving the market distribution of income by a variety of 
policies to build institutions and re-regulate the labour market, improve the union legislation, 
increase the coverage of collective bargaining, and enforce equal pay legislation more 
effectively.8  
Coordination of wage policies at the European level is crucial to ensure that wages 
increase in line with historical increases in productivity to stabilize effective demand, avoid 
counter-productive beggar thy neighbour policies, and prevent a race to the bottom. In the 
Euro area, this implies that wage policy has to take into account current account surpluses as 
much as deficits and coordination must aim at avoiding a deflationary adjustment with 
substantially higher wage growth in the surplus countries, while also aiming at convergence in 
productivity through active investment policies (Onaran and Stockhammer, 2016).  
Combining egalitarian labour market and tax policies with public spending policies 
are important not only for achieving higher growth, investment and sustainable debt levels but 
also for other important social targets, such as lowering carbon emissions via green 
investments or improving gender equality via public spending in social infrastructure (Obst, 
Onaran, Nikolaidi, 2017; Cozzi, 2017). Similarly, public investment policies are key to 
                                                 
8
 Guschanski and Onaran (2016) estimates that a rise in minimum wages, or changes in labour market and trade 
union and collective bargaining legislation to increase the bargaining power of unions are very effective policies 
to offset the negative impact of technological change or globalisation on the wage share in Europe. The results 
are robust, if the wage share excluding the income of the top 1% of the waged and salaried people are used as the 
dependent variable. 
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achieving structural change, higher productivity in tradable sectors and keeping trade balance 
under control while still managing an egalitarian economic model.  
A strong investment performance also requires a process of de-financialization of 
the economy (Tori and Onaran, 2017). Managers’ short-termist behaviour and decisions 
exclusively aimed at maximizing dividends distributed to the shareholders should be 
disincentivized. What is needed is the provision of an institutional setting for the NFCs 
that encourage management orientation towards long term growth and, more generally, 
‘stakeholder value’. This should be addressed in particular in the case of larger 
corporations.  
The focus of corporate governance should be on the destination of the funds. The 
corporation today is an institution composed of different layers of productive and non-
operating activities. Policies should aim at favouring a productive destination of NFCs’ 
internal funds, e.g. higher rate of taxation on profits which are not invested (Tori and 
Onaran, 2017).  
Given the negative effect of excessive financial development on NFCs’ investment, 
the policy recommendation for countries with low levels would be to prevent further de-
regulation of financial markets and/or intermediaries in order to avoid the negative 
effect associated with high levels of financial development (Tori and Onaran, 2017).  
Last but not least, a well designed public investment programme can be effective 
in reversing the financialization-led investment depletion. Alongside the re-regulation of 
the financial sphere of our economies (both at the macro and at the corporate levels), 
the reform of a Financialised system needs coordinated public investments. In fact, the 
public sector can act as the catalyst and driver of a new phase in which NFCs’ objectives 
are essentially brought back to productive and stable capital accumulation. The various 
waves of liberalization and privatisation of large part of the economics systems fostered 
the emergence of behaviours detached from the objectives of equality and prosperity. 
The evidence speaks in favour of a vast program of public investment that can provide a 
consistent and sustainable ‘direction’ to the private investment. Under the guidance of a 
macroeconomic policy framework focused on full employment and equality, which helps 
to define and improve the vector of choices of firms, private shareholders themselves 
could see the long-term stability of the corporation as their main goal once again. 
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Figure 1: The share of wages in GDP* and Growth of GDP in the EU15, 1960-2015 
 
 
 
Note: Labour compensation adjusted for the labour income of the self employed as a ratio to 
GDP at factor cost; 2014 and 2015 are provisional data. (Source: AMECO). 
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Figure 2. Additions to fixed assets/operating income (I/π), NFCs, Europe14 and selected 
countries, 1995-2015  
 
Source: Tori and Onaran (2017) based on Worldscope data. 
 
Figure 3. Financial assets/fixed assets (FA/K), NFCs, Europe14  and selected countries, 
1995-2015 
 
 
Source: Tori and Onaran (2017) based on Worldscope data 
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Figure 4. Investment/Fixed Assets (I/K), total financial payments/fixed assets (F/K), 
and total financial profits/fixed assets (πF/K, RHA), NFCs, Europe, 1995-2015 
 
 
Source: Tori and Onaran (2017) based on Worldscope data 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Job creation in 1000 jobs 
 
Source: Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) based on the FEPS-ECLM International Input-
Output Model. 
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Figure 6. Job creation of the green and social investments by skill levels 
 
Source: Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) based on the FEPS-ECLM International Input-
Output Model. 
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Table 1. The effects of a simultaneous change of the policy mix in all countries 
 
Source: Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi (2017) Table 9. Note: Regressions for Luxembourg are based on estimation in Onaran and Obst (2016). A = Austria, B = Belgium, DK = 
Denmark, FIN = Finland, F = France, D = Germany, GR = Greece, IRL = Ireland, I = Italy, NL = Netherlands, P = Portugal, E = Spain, S = Sweden, UK = United Kingdom. 
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP. 
** Combines both policy mixes of column A and column B - A 1% point fall in profit share; a 1% point increase in public spending; a 1% point fall in ITR on labour income; and 
a 1% increase in ITR on capital income. 
The effect of a simultaneous 1% 
point fall in profit share and a 
1% increase in public spending 
on equilibrium aggregate 
demand of each national 
economy  ∆Y/Y
The effect of a simulteaneous 1% 
point fall in ITR on labour income 
and a 1% point increase in ITR on 
capital income on equilibrium 
aggregate demand of each national 
economy ∆Y/Y
Total European multiplier effect of a 
simultaneous combined change in income 
distribution, government expenditures and 
taxation on capital and labour income on 
equilibrium demand of each national economy 
∆Y/Y
Total European multiplier effect of a 
simulteanous combined change in income 
distribution, government expenditures and 
implicit tax rate on capital and labour income on 
private investment of each national economy 
∆I/Y
A B C** D**
A 6.41 1.49 7.75 2.06
B 2.81 0.69 3.28 0.82
DK 4.73 1.21 5.83 0.85
FIN 13.68 2.17 11.72 4.19
F 4.35 1.38 5.13 1.01
D 5.28 1.46 6.63 1.47
GR 12.82 1.87 14.48 3.34
IRL 2.29 0.52 2.68 1.61
I 3.25 0.63 3.78 0.57
L 3.85 0.91 4.56 0.69
NL 8.89 2.17 10.74 2.02
P 6.12 1.79 7.29 2.92
E 12.96 3.22 15.49 3.84
S 9.12 1.63 9.67 2.54
UK 3.55 1.14 4.49 0.85
EU15 GDP* 5.57 1.43 6.64 1.46
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Table 2. Total effects of a policy mix on budget balance following a simultaneous change in all countries 
 
Source: Obst, Onaran, Nikolaidi (2017) Table 10.   
1%-point 
fall in 
profit share
1%-point 
increase in 
public spending
1%-point increase in 
taxation on capital 
income
1%-point fall in 
taxation on wage 
income
Combined effect on 
budget balance
A B C D E
A 0.254 -0.222 0.219 0.900 1.150
B 0.046 -0.735 0.253 0.725 0.290
DK 0.192 -0.450 0.243 0.818 0.803
FIN 0.171 -0.017 0.228 0.874 1.257
F 0.154 -0.510 0.190 0.908 0.742
D 0.342 -0.362 0.257 0.932 1.168
GR 0.007 -0.981 0.358 0.554 -0.062
IRL 0.012 -0.972 0.303 0.602 -0.055
I 0.049 -0.673 0.290 0.702 0.367
L 0.050 -0.851 0.397 0.582 0.178
NL 0.208 -0.142 0.183 1.002 1.250
P 0.115 -0.406 0.227 0.911 0.847
E 0.617 0.359 0.227 1.209 2.412
S 0.114 -0.561 0.272 0.650 0.475
UK 0.119 -0.801 0.256 0.742 0.317
* Change in each country is multiplied by its share in EU15 GDP 0.839
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Table 3. Economic effects by country, disaggregation by level of financial development (FD) 1995-2007 
 
 
Source: Tori and Onaran (2017), Table 3. S/K: Sales/Fixed Assets; F/K: total financial payments/fixed assets; π/K: operating income/fixed assets; 
πF/K: total financial profits/fixed assets; ΔTD/TA: change in total debt/total assets; HD: high financial development; LD: low financial development. 
The economic effects for single countries are based on estimated elasticities in Table 2, Column 2, specification 3 in Tori and Onaran (2017). The 
economic effects for Europe are based on estimated elasticities in Table 1, Column 2, specification 1 in Tori and Onaran (2017). 
 
 
  
Country FD
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
Germany HD 0.293 0.747 0.219 0.018 2.911 0.052 -0.368 1.319 -0.485 -0.129 0.442 -0.057 -0.048 0.029 -0.001
Spain HD 0.293 0.135 0.040 0.018 0.536 0.010 -0.368 0.713 -0.262 -0.129 0.517 -0.067 -0.048 0.391 -0.019
Finland HD 0.293 1.227 0.360 0.018 1.140 0.021 -0.368 0.771 -0.284 -0.129 1.017 -0.131 -0.048 -0.300 0.014
France HD 0.293 0.783 0.229 0.018 1.003 0.018 -0.368 0.423 -0.156 -0.129 0.508 -0.065 -0.048 0.050 -0.002
The Netherlands HD 0.293 0.614 0.180 0.018 0.412 0.007 -0.368 0.789 -0.290 -0.129 -0.044 0.006 -0.048 0.070 -0.003
Sweden HD 0.293 1.830 0.536 0.018 1.391 0.025 -0.368 1.927 -0.709 -0.129 1.866 -0.241 -0.048 -0.051 0.002
UK HD 0.293 0.842 0.247 0.018 1.273 0.023 -0.368 1.367 -0.503 -0.129 1.029 -0.133 -0.048 0.233 -0.011
Belgium LD 0.293 0.509 0.149 0.369 1.428 0.527 0.196 0.387 0.076 -0.209 0.727 -0.152 0.000 0.042 0.000
Denmark LD 0.293 0.714 0.209 0.369 0.675 0.249 0.196 0.183 0.036 -0.209 1.226 -0.256 0.000 0.108 0.000
Greece LD 0.293 -0.211 -0.062 0.369 -0.284 -0.105 0.196 0.099 0.019 -0.209 -0.301 0.063 0.000 0.289 0.000
Ireland LD 0.293 1.315 0.385 0.369 1.333 0.492 0.196 -0.015 -0.003 -0.209 0.910 -0.190 0.000 -0.049 0.000
Italy LD 0.293 0.861 0.252 0.369 1.050 0.387 0.196 0.276 0.054 -0.209 0.575 -0.120 0.000 -0.012 0.000
Austria LD 0.293 0.067 0.020 0.369 1.004 0.370 0.196 0.168 0.033 -0.209 1.273 -0.266 0.000 0.055 0.000
Portugal LD 0.293 0.749 0.219 0.369 0.165 0.061 0.196 1.300 0.255 -0.209 0.514 -0.107 0.000 0.455 0.000
Europe 0.847 0.727 0.616 0.000 1.003 0.000 -0.150 0.693 -0.104 -0.374 0.733 -0.274 -0.037 0.093 -0.003
ΔTD/TAS/K π/K πF/K F/K
28 
 
Table 4. Economic effects by country, disaggregation by level of financial development (FD) and by size, 1995-2007 
 
Source: Tori and Onaran (2017), Table 4. S/K: Sales/Fixed Assets; F/K: total financial payments/fixed assets; (π-CD)/K: (operating income-
cash dividends)/fixed assets; πF/K: total financial profits/fixed assets; ΔTD/TA: change in total debt/total assets;   HD: high financial 
development; LD: low financial development. The economic effects for single countries are based on estimated elasticities in Table 2, specification 
4 in Tori and Onaran (2017). The economic effects for Europe are based on estimated elasticities in Table 1, Column 3, specification 2 in Tori and 
Onaran (2017). 
Country FD SIZE
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulativ
e Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
 Long-run 
Coefficient 
Actual 
cumulative 
Change 
Economic 
Effect  
LARGE -0.359 1.093 -0.392 -0.159 0.358 -0.057
SMALL -0.204 1.755 -0.358 0.000 0.466 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.588 -0.211 -0.159 0.569 -0.091
SMALL -0.204 1.444 -0.294 0.000 0.287 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.720 -0.258 -0.159 1.261 -0.201
SMALL -0.204 1.193 -0.243 0.000 0.891 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.449 -0.161 -0.159 0.412 -0.066
SMALL -0.204 1.760 -0.359 0.000 0.933 0.000
LARGE -0.359 0.684 -0.245 -0.159 0.189 -0.030
SMALL -0.204 1.070 -0.218 0.000 -0.745 0.000
LARGE -0.359 1.310 -0.470 -0.159 1.670 -0.266
SMALL -0.204 2.417 -0.493 0.000 2.129 0.000
LARGE -0.359 1.154 -0.414 -0.159 1.004 -0.160
SMALL -0.204 1.715 -0.350 0.000 1.381 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.394 0.000 -0.277 2.232 -0.618
SMALL 0.604 1.849 1.117 0.000 1.885 0.000
LARGE 0.000 -0.724 0.000 -0.277 1.209 -0.335
SMALL 0.604 0.325 0.196 0.000 1.284 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.052 0.000 -0.277 -0.279 0.077
SMALL 0.604 0.926 0.560 0.000 -0.264 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.578 0.000 -0.277 0.518 -0.143
SMALL 0.604 3.674 2.219 0.000 1.727 0.000
LARGE 0.000 -0.048 0.000 -0.277 0.475 -0.131
SMALL 0.604 0.990 0.598 0.000 1.503 0.000
LARGE 0.000 0.210 0.000 -0.277 1.064 -0.294
SMALL 0.604 -0.681 -0.411 0.000 2.205 0.000
LARGE 0.000 1.261 0.000 -0.277 0.555 -0.153
SMALL 0.604 -0.205 -0.124 0.000 0.179 0.000
LARGE -0.179 0.560 -0.100 -0.077 0.802 -0.062
SMALL 0.242 1.302 0.315 -0.270 0.990 -0.268
0.000LD 0.467 0.749 0.350 0.432 0.165 0.071 0.000 0.455
ΔTD/TA
0.5360.0220.0630.135
Belgium
UK
Sweden
The Netherlands
France
S/K (π-CD)/K πF/K F/K
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.714 0.333
0.022
Italy
Austria
Europe
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
HD
LD
LD
LD
LD
LD
LD
Denmark 
Germany
Finland
Greece
Ireland
HDSpain
Portugal
0.509 0.238
-0.211
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.467
0.747 0.349
1.227 0.573
0.783 0.366
0.614 0.287
1.830 0.854
0.614
-0.099
0.861 0.402
0.727 0.725
0.067 0.031
0.467
0.467
0.997
0.412 0.009
0.022 1.140 0.025
0.012
0.842 0.393
0.053 1.003 0.054
0.432 0.4331.004
0.432 -0.284 -0.123
0.432 1.050 0.453
0.432 1.333 0.5751.315
-0.043 0.029 -0.001
-0.043 0.050 -0.002
0.432 0.675 0.291
0.022 1.273 0.028
0.022 1.390 0.031
0.432 1.428 0.616
0.022 2.911 0.064
0.022 1.003 0.022
0.000
0.000 -0.012 0.000
-0.049 0.000
-0.043 -0.051 0.002
0.000 0.042 0.000
0.000 0.055 0.000
-0.043 0.391 -0.017
-0.025 0.093 -0.002
-0.043 -0.300 0.013
-0.043 0.070 -0.003
-0.043 0.233 -0.010
0.000 0.108 0.000
0.000
0.000 0.289
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Table 5. Female employment as % of male employment  
  
Historical Projections 
Scenario 2000 2008 2015 2017 2025 
South 
Eurozone 
60.66 70.62 71.5 
70.7 68.37 Austerity 
71.63 72.16 Expansionary 
72.98 75.76 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
North 
Eurozone 
77.85 84.29 86.82 
87.03 87.77 Austerity 
86.97 88.8 Expansionary 
87.32 89.9 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
United 
Kingdom 
83.78 84.89 85.63 
85.97 86.07 Austerity 
85.61 87.37 Expansionary 
85.94 88.33 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
 
Table 6. Non-carbon energy as a share of energy production  
  
Historical Projections 
Scenario 2000 2008 2015 2017 2025 
South 
Eurozone 
28.19 38.79 46.1 
46.7 50.5 Austerity 
46.19 52.12 Expansionary 
56 59.57 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
North 
Eurozone 
32.18 31.21 34.37 
37.78 47.97 Austerity 
37.89 48.62 Expansionary 
41.8 52.96 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
United 
Kingdom 
3.79 4.23 10.53 
12.14 18.28 Austerity 
11.98 18.98 Expansionary 
16.04 21.66 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
 
Source: Cozzi, 2017 
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Table 7. Average GDP Growth (%) 
  
Historical Projections 
Scenario 2000-2007 2008-2016 2017-2025 
South 
Eurozone 
2.68 -0.82 
0.62 Austerity 
2.99 Expansionary 
2.05 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
North 
Eurozone 
2.05 0.72 
1.33 Austerity 
2.34 Expansionary 
2.27 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
United 
Kingdom 
3.06 0.89 
0.74 Austerity 
2.81 Expansionary 
2.66 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
 
Table 8. Government spending as % of GDP 
  
Historical Projections 
Scenario 2000 2008 2015 2017 2025 
South 
Eurozone 
20.12 22.4 20.34 
19.48 19 Austerity 
22.21 26.7 Expansionary 
21.49 23.31 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
North 
Eurozone 
22.06 22.4 22.9 
22 21.06 Austerity 
22.36 21.49 Expansionary 
22.34 21.59 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
United 
Kingdom 
18.86 23.37 20.76 
19.61 17.59 Austerity 
20.16 22.85 Expansionary 
19.92 22.17 Sustainable & Equitable Expansionary 
 
Source: Cozzi, 2017  
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Table 9. Emission intensity: CO2 emissions per $ of GDP (Kg per $) 
  
Historical Projections 
Scenario 2000 2008 2015 2017 2025 
South 
Eurozone 
0.291 0.256 0.229 
0.224 0.191 Austerity 
0.219 0.185 Expansionary 
0.203 0.168 
Sustainable & Equitable 
Expansionary 
North 
Eurozone 
0.276 0.236 0.222 
0.21 0.165 Austerity 
0.2 0.161 Expansionary 
0.2 0.155 
Sustainable & Equitable 
Expansionary 
United 
Kingdom 
0.302 0.238 0.222 
0.215 0.181 Austerity 
0.221 0.175 Expansionary 
0.199 0.157 
Sustainable & Equitable 
Expansionary 
Source: Cozzi, 2017 
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Table 10. Employment and GDP effects of the Green-Social Investment Plan 
 Employment, 1000 jobs  GDP, percent 
(pct. change in sector) 
 GDP, percentage points 
(growth contribution to 
pct. change in total GDP) 
 Direct 
effect 
Indirect 
effect 
Total  Direct 
effect 
Indirect 
effect 
Total  Direct 
effect 
Indirect 
effect 
Total 
Green Investments:            
Construction 498 97 595  3,2 0,6 3,8  0,19 0,04 0,22 
Renting, R&D and other 
Business Activities. 
151 125 276  0,5 0,5 1,0  0,07 0,06 0,12 
Spillovers from green 
investments on all 
other sectors 
0 307 307  0,0 0,2 0,2  0,00 0,15 0,15 
Total Green 649 528 1178  0,3 0,2 0,5  0,25 0,24 0,49 
Social Investments:            
Education 864 31 895  5,4 0,2 5,6  0,28 0,01 0,29 
Health and Social Work 
(child care) 
459 28 487  2,0 0,1 2,1  0,15 0,01 0,16 
Spillovers from social 
investments on all 
other sectors 
0 192 192  0,0 0,1 0,1  0,00 0,09 0,09 
Total Social 1323 251 1574  0,4 0,1 0,5  0,42 0,11 0,54 
            
Total investment plan 
(Green+Social) 
1973 779 2752  0,7 0,4 1,0  0,68 0,35 1,03 
Source: ECLM based on the FEPS-ECLM International Input-Output Model, Andersen, Dahl and Nissen (2017) 
 
 
